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THE SUPREME COURT'S ROLE: GUARANTOR OF
INDIVIDUAL AND MINORITY GROUP RIGHTS
Nadine Strossen*
We have just celebrated the Bicentennial of the United States
Bill of Rights, a marvelous document that not only has been used
to secure a broad range of freedoms for many people in this coun-
try, but also has inspired and served as a model for liberty-loving
peoples the world over. However, the freedoms enunciated in the
Bill of Rights - as well as in other Constitutional provisions -
are not self-enforcing.
As recognized in writings of the Constitution's framers, and as
explicitly held by Chief Justice John Marshall in the landmark
case of Marbury v. Madison,' it is the special responsibility of the
federal courts, headed by the United States Supreme Court, to in-
terpret and enforce the Constitution. That responsibility is espe-
cially important in cases involving the rights of individuals and mi-
nority groups. Although all government officials take an oath to
uphold the Constitution, officials who are elected by majority vote
often reflect the majoritarian interests to which they are accounta-
ble. In contrast, the Constitution provides that federal judges have
lifetime tenure, subject to removal only under extraordinary cir-
cumstances, through impeachment. This insulation from the politi-
cal sphere ensures that federal courts should be able to enforce the
rights of even unpopular individuals and minority groups.
Perhaps the most eloquent expression of this special federal
court role is Justice Jackson's statement in West Virginia State
Board of Education v. Barnette,2 which struck down statutes forc-
ing public school students to salute the American flag, even when
their religious beliefs - as in the case of Jehovah's Witness chil-
dren - forbade the salute. Justice Jackson declared:
* Professor of Law, New York Law School; President, American Civil Liberties Union;
A.B., 1972, Harvard-Radcliffe College; J.D., 1975, Harvard Ilaw School.
1. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
2. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
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The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain sub-
jects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them be-
yond the reach of majorities and officials and to establish them as
legal principles to be applied by the courts. One's right to life, lib-
erty, and property, to free speech, a free press, freedom of worship
and assembly, and other fundamental rights may not be submitted
to vote; they depend on the outcome of no elections.3
During much of this century, the Supreme Court fulfilled its
unique role as the ultimate guarantor of individual and minority
group rights by subjecting governmental decisions that infringed
on those rights to searching judicial review. Especially under the
leadership of Chief Justices Earl Warren and Warren Burger, the
Court helped to transform the paper promises of the Bill of Rights
and other constitutional provisions - notably, the equality and
due process guarantees of the post-Civil War constitutional
amendments - into actual rights for many groups and individuals
whose liberty had been ignored or oppressed by the majoritarian
branches of governments. These included African-Americans, other
racial and religious minorities groups, women, and children.
Under the leadership of Chief Justice Rehnquist, however, the
Court has abandoned its constitutionally prescribed, unique role as
the guardian of individual and minority group rights. Instead, it
routinely defers to and upholds the decisions of majoritarian gov-
ernmental officials, even when those decisions infringe fundamen-
tal rights of minorities.
One of many rulings that dramatically illustrates the Rehnquist
Court's hands-off posture is Employment Division v. Smith,4 a
1990 decision which refused to enforce the First Amendment's reli-
gious freedom guarantees to protect individuals who had used pe-
yote in sacramental rites of the Native American Church, where
the state's criminal drug laws made no exemption for the religious
use of peyote. The Court said that the only recourse for members
of the Native American Church was to try to persuade the state
legislature to enact such an exemption. The Smith opinion can-
didly acknowledged that, in being forced to seek protection for
their religious practices through the political process, members of
minority religions are "at a relative disadvantage." 5 It dismissed
3. Id. at 638.
4. 110 S. Ct. 1595 (1990).
5. Id. at 1606.
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this concern, though, with the conclusory assertion that the dis-
criminatory abridgment of the constitutional rights of minority
groups is the "unavoidable consequence of democratic
government."6
To the contrary, it is the Court's constitutional and historic re-
sponsibility to avoid exactly such consequences. As the supreme
enforcer of the Bill of Rights, its unique role is to prevent the "tyr-
anny of the majority" that our founders feared would occur absent
judicially enforceable freedoms. Indeed, Justice O'Connor's sepa-
rate opinion in Smith sharply criticized the majority's relegation of
minority rights to an admittedly unsympathetic political process.
She noted that "the First Amendment was enacted precisely to
protect the rights of those whose religious practices are not shared
by the majority and may be viewed with hostility," and quoted the
stirring statement from Barnette set out above.7
In contrast to Justice O'Connor's opinion, the Smith majority
opinion did not cite Barnette. To the contrary, the majority opin-
ion twice relied on Minersville School District v. Gobitis, the long
since discredited decision that rejected the religious freedom
claims of Amish schoolchildren and that Barnette had overruled.
Ominously, in citing Gobitis, the Smith majority did not even note
the fact that it was subsequently overruled by a decision that has
been hailed as a landmark of liberty. This breach of the basic rules
of citation signals that the Court is literally rewriting constitu-
tional history and constitutional law.
Devastating as the Smith decision was from the perspective of
religious freedom, it is important to stress that its adverse impact
transcends the sphere of religious liberty. It exemplifies the Court's
general abdication of its special constitutional role as the protector
of the entire spectrum of fundamental rights for individuals and
minority groups. This abandonment has marked the Court's recent
decisions concerning every constitutional liberty, including free-
dom of speech, which many experts have considered a "preferred"
right. As Justice Thurgood Marshall charged, in his last dissenting
opinion before resigning from the Court, the Rehnquist majority
6. Id.
7. Id. at 1613 (O'Conner, J., concurring).
8. 310 U.S. 586 (1940), overruled by West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319
U.S. 624 (1943).
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"will squander the authority and the legitimacy of this Court as a
protector of the powerless." 9
9. Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S. Ct. 2597, 2625 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
